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Abstract
It is NP-hard to decide if a given pure strategy Nash equilibrium of a given three-player game in
strategic form with integer payoffs is trembling hand perfect.
1 Introduction
Trembling hand perfection [5] is a well-established refinement of Nash equilibrium. We prove:
Theorem 1. It is NP-hard to decide if a given pure strategy Nash equilibrium of a given three-player game
in strategic form is trembling hand perfect.
In particular, unless P=NP, there is no polynomial time algorithm for deciding if a given equilibrium of
a given three-player game in strategic form is trembling hand perfect. Arguably, this can be interpreted as
a deficiency of the trembling hand solution concept.
Note that in contrast to the above hardness result, one may efficiently determine if a given equilibrium
of a two-player game is trembling hand perfect. Indeed, for the two-player case, an equilibrium is trembling
hand perfect if and only if it is undominated. This can be checked by linear programming in polynomial
time.
The proof below can be rather easily modified to show that it is NP-hard to decide if a given equilibrium
of a three-player game is proper [4]. For properness, we do not know if the two-player case is easy or not.
Finally, we remark that we do not know if it is in NP to decide if a given equilibrium is perfect (or proper).
It seems that an obvious nondeterministic algorithm would be to guess a lexicographic belief structure and
appeal to the characterizations of Blume et al [1] and Govindan and Klumpp [3] of trembling hand perfection
in terms of these. However, we do not know if a lexicographic belief structure witnessing perfection (or
properness) can be represented as a polynomial length string over a finite alphabet.
2 Proof
Our proof is a reduction from the problem of approximately computing minmax values of 3-player games
with 0-1 payoffs, a problem that was recently shown to be NP-hard by Borgs et al [2]. In particular, it
follows from Borgs et al. that the following promise problem MINMAX is NP-hard:
MINMAX:
1. YES-instances: Pairs (G, r) for which the minmax value for Player 1 in the 3-player game G is strictly
smaller than the rational number r.
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2. NO-instances: Pairs (G, r) for which the minmax value for Player 1 in G is strictly greater than r.
In fact, by multiplying the payoffs of the game with the denominator of r, we can without loss of generality
assume that r is an integer. We now reduce MINMAX to deciding trembling hand perfection.
Let G be a three-player game in strategic form and let r be an integer. We define G′ be the game where
the strategy space of each player is as in G, except that it is extended by a single pure strategy, ⊥. The
payoffs of G′ are defined as follow. The payoff to Players 2 and 3 are 0 for all strategy combinations. The
payoff to Player 1 is r for all strategy combinations where at least one player plays ⊥. For those strategy
combinations where no player plays ⊥, the payoff to player 1 is the same as it would have been in the game
G. Obviously, µ = (⊥,⊥,⊥) is a Nash equilibrium of G′.
We claim that if the minmax value for Player 1 in G is strictly smaller than r, then µ is a trembling hand
perfect equilibrium of G′. Indeed, let (τ2, τ3) be a minmax strategy profile of Players 2 and 3 in G. Let τ
be any profile of G′ where Players 2 and 3 play (τ2, τ3). Also, let u be the strategy profile of G
′ where each
player mixes all pure strategies uniformly. Now define
σk = (1−
1
k
−
1
k2
)µ+
1
k
τ +
1
k2
u
We have that σk is a fully mixed strategy profile of G
′ converging to µ as k →∞. Also, for sufficiently large
k, the strategies of µ are best replies to σk. This follows from the fact that Players 2 and 3 are indifferent
about the outcome and the fact that Player 1 gets payoff r by playing ⊥ while he gets a payoff strictly
smaller than r for large values of k by playing any other strategy. We conclude that µ is trembling hand
perfect, as desired.
On the other hand, we claim that if the minmax value for Player 1 in G is strictly greater than r, then
µ is a not a trembling hand perfect equilibrium of G′. Indeed, let (σk,1, σk,2, σk,3)k be any sequence of fully
mixed strategy profiles converging to (⊥,⊥,⊥). Since σk,2 and σk,3 do not put all their probability mass on
⊥, Player 1 has a reply to (σk,2, σk,3) with an expected payoff strictly greater than r. Therefore, ⊥ is not a
best reply of Player 1 to (σk,2, σk,3) and we conclude that (⊥,⊥,⊥) is not trembling hand perfect.
That is, we have reduced the promise problem MINMAX to deciding trembling hand perfection and are
done.
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